What the president needs is a roadmap that focuses on the big picture and provides substance beyond the spin, something which is sorely lacking at the moment.
For a president whose meteoric rise on the back of wall-to-wall coverage and fawning over by the media delivered him instant rock star political status during the campaign, the complaint that the media has now turned from doting parent to vengeful god, is rather questionable.
For the first time in our political history, a triumvirate (someone called it a three-headed beast) weaves and spins the yarn concerning the goings on in the palace. If three heads are better than one, then why should the Benign One not be receiving more favorable coverage from the echo chamber? The problem has got nothing to do with the messaging and all to do with the message itself.
“Without vision, people perish,” so the biblical proverb goes. Every occupant of the Palace knows that after a while, the daily grind of official duties prevents him or her from thinking about the broad frame. It is easy to get lost in the day-to-day political tussle to get on top of the 24 hour news cycle. The most precious commodity for any leader is time to think and reflect. They say, the minute that goes, you’re basically a goner.
So it seems now with the Benevolent One, in his first year, his communications group has successfully come up with a plethora of platitudes that are an instant hit with the public. Kung walang kurap…, Daang matuwid, Bawal ang wang-wang: these make for good slogans and rallying cries. The problem is that the administration lacks a coherent roadmap that would convert these into the kinds of meaningful results that people have been craving.
Approaching the first full year in office, three alarm signals are flashing. They point to a lack of crispness in the strategic frame hampering this presidency. These signals involve a mix-mash of mental models to guide the broad philosophy of governance that defines the role of the state; personality-driven factionalism that breeds organizational dysfunction, and an absence of credible commitment to deliver on its promises. Together, these signals flag the need for Palace insiders to re-group and re-think their strategic priorities.
Outmoded mental models
When the president made his “no new taxes” pledge before the Makati Business Club forum during the 2010 election campaign, he was evoking a theme often presented during the 1980s and 90s by the Washington elite that espoused a limited role for government or the “magic of the Market” as a formula for development. This meant that the best state was a reduced one. Economic development could proceed if countries followed the mantra to “stabilize, liberalize, privatize.”
This dovetailed neatly with the post-EDSA-I contempt for anything to do with the state apparatus and crony capitalism fostered under the deposed dictator. The Aquino-I regime promised to honor all loan contracts entered into by the Philippine government regardless of whether they were tainted with corruption as a way to maintain its creditworthiness. To make room for debt repayments, it practiced fiscal austerity and reduced the state’s role in performing many of its social obligations.
In the breach, the (big M) Market would step in to provide public infrastructure and jobs that would reduce social dislocation. This was the underlying philosophy that prevailed at that time. To complement this strategy and to make good on its promises to meet its financial obligations, a comprehensive adjustment to the tax system was implemented in 1986.
This re-structure according to one of its chief architects allowed the tax-to-GDP ratio to steadily climb, so that by the early 90s, when Aquino-I stepped down, the fiscal situation was on a sound fiscal footing. The administration that succeeded it sought to bring about the full blooming of the Washington world view on local soil by accelerating trade liberalization and expanding fiscal incentives to foreign investors.
The early success in the 1990s of this formula eventually bred euphoric overconfidence. After reaching a high-water mark in the mid-90s of 19% (high for a developing economy with a limited tax base), the tax-to-GDP ratio began a steady decline as a result of the comprehensive tax reform package of 1997. Meanwhile the Asian Financial Crisis intervened and began challenging the mental frame of the policy elite.
From 1998 onwards, a new post-consensus consensus was being formed. Market liberalization was necessary but insufficient, it declared. State capacity had to be built up to ensure that the right institutions would govern market transactions to prevent “exuberance” of the kind that led to market crashes. It also had to provide social safety nets to protect those adversely affected by market reforms and business cycles.
This became evident to the Philippine elite, whose business interests escaped relatively unscathed from the Asian flu, but saw them subsequently threatened by a number of anomalies involving the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Office of the President which nearly short circuited the banking system and local bourse. Meanwhile the costs of a war in the south began to hurt the bottom-line and a fiscal crisis loomed.
Corrective measures had to be put in place to raise personal and corporate income tax rates (temporarily) at a time when other nations in the region were cutting theirs. Meanwhile, the government was treating its sin taxes (which had switched from being a fixed percentage to a fixed level not indexed to inflation in 1997) as a sacred cow and began enacting numerous and redundant fiscal incentives and tax rebates that caused revenues that resulted from an increase to the consumption tax rate to erode.
The conservative Heritage Foundation which ranks countries based on their ability to provide economic freedom often gives a more favorable score to less developed nations in the area of fiscal freedom given their low level of tax collection as a share of the economy. The Philippines over the past decade having a low tax-to-GDP ratio would have fared better under the Foundation’s scoring method but for its “relatively high” income tax rates.
The simultaneous presence of high income tax rates and low tax collections could only mean that either the tax base is too narrow, in which case the solution would be to flatten the rates and widen the base, or that many tax leaks exist and dishonesty in declaring income abound, in which case a closing of those loopholes and going after tax cheats is needed.
Enter the Aquino-II regime which re-branded the privatization model adopted under Aquino-I while expanding the state’s role to deal with a growing social agenda. Unfortunately, it failed to see that this expanded role required a shift in the tax structure. The “no new taxes” pledge was based on the idea that renewing the public’s trust in government would lead to better tax compliance–a view that is increasingly seen as untenable.
Even with a highly competent, honest and dedicated finance team going after tax cheats, the tax take as a share of GDP has fallen. Perhaps the notion that public trust in government engendering proper tax declarations is going to suffer the same fate as the idea that economic growth naturally lowering the incidence of poverty. The Philippines seems to be the graveyard of many grand theories on development.
Having declared during the campaign that there would be no new taxes has meant that any reasonable time table for tax reform would be at least until after the 2013 mid-term elections. That in turn would mean that any structural adjustment involving taxes (raising it from the current 13% back to about 19%) would only bear fruit during the latter two years of this presidency and that many of the Millenium Development Goals will be missed.
Having staked all his eggs in the Daang Matuwid basket, the president now is facing the distinct possibility of failing to deliver on much of his social compact: the result of relying too blindly on an unproven theory that makes for a good sound byte, but lacks a grand vision.
Even with the capitulation of the ombudsman opening up the prospect of jail time for the Inglorious One and her henchmen, the sad fact of the matter is that even if that were to occur, it would not help improve the finances of the government substantially nor bridge the yawning social divide that exists.
Before the president gets locked-in to a kind of group-think paralysis that eventually occurs when one hops on the treadmill of public office, he needs to find a way to re-assess the situation and come up with a strategy that will act as a game changer before it is too late. Key to this would be discarding some of the mental models that act as blinkers and prevent him from seizing opportunities for change.
>>> to be continued…(see part 2: Curing dysfunctionalism)