arroyo

Is Aquino Just A Popular Version of Arroyo?

In an excellent piece for the Guardian newspaper, Slavoj Žižek makes reference to the work of philosopher Jean-Claude Milner who he says

proposed the notion of the “stabilising class”: not the old ruling class, but all who are committed to the stability and continuity of the existing social, economic and political order – the class of those who, even when they call for a change, do so to ensure that nothing really will change (emphasis mine).

Žižek asserts that the key to electoral success in 2012 was in a party’s ability to win over this class, which is what President Obama did by pitting his stable leadership against the radical changes proposed by the “Republican market and religious fundamentalists”.  Even now, Mitt Romney proves just how disconnected he is when he characterised as providing “gifts” to minorities the policies that Obama took to the electorate.  As for President Obama’s first term, Žižek goes on to say that

(m)any disappointed by his presidency held against him precisely the fact that the core of his much-publicised “hope” proved to be that the system can survive with modest changes (emphasis mine).

The same can be said of President Noynoy Aquino’s election in 2010. As the “hope and change” candidate of that electoral cycle, the people that elected him were merely seeking to restore the Philippines to the state his mother had left it in back in 1992. The purpose of his candidacy was to pull the country back from the brink of destruction and restore dignity and faith in the political system.

The very thesis of Corazon Aquino’s presidency was to prove that the pre-Martial Law, landed gentry could govern with self-restraint. For as long as the ruling class could manage to do so, the system of governance that she put in place would be able to accommodate the demands of the masses. For as long as there remained some modicum of decency (what Filipinos call delicadeza) from elites, any radical overhaul of the system could be avoided.

This is perhaps why President Aquino has so far shied away from pursuing any structural change in his campaign against corruption. This could be why he put off proposing any new revenue measures like the indexation of sin taxes until now. It could also be why despite promising to support reproductive health reforms he initially backed away from supporting it once in office. And it could also be why he signed into law the anti-cybercrime bill that many have derided for restricting freedom of expression, and why he is against tinkering with the constitution.

Instead of introducing change through these measures, Mr Aquino’s administration cranked up the programs and policies pursued by his predecessor, namely the conditional cash transfers program, universal kindergarten education, PhilHealth expansion, the anti-tax cheat program called RATE, business process outsourcing and tourism promotion and the euphemistic “fiscal consolidation” program. These were all begun by Mrs Arroyo whose popularity never seemed to benefit from them.

So, to mimic Žižek who rhetorically asked whether Obama was just “Bush with a human face”, can we also pose the question, “Is PNoy simply a popular version of PGMA?”

In the case of Obama, Žižek gives us reason to disagree with the assertion that he is merely Bush with a human face in that

(a)lthough his healthcare reforms were mired in so many compromises they amounted to almost nothing, the debate triggered was of huge importance. A great art of politics is to insist on a particular demand that, while thoroughly realist, feasible and legitimate, disturbs the core of the hegemonic ideology. The healthcare reforms were a step in this direction – how else to explain the panic and fury they triggered in the Republican camp?

In a previous post on this topic, I likened the debate America was having on healthcare with the one the Philippines is currently engaged in with respect to the reproductive health reform measure in Congress. Both touch on a nerve that is fundamental to the psyche of each nation with respect to the choice being considered and challenge each country’s default position with regard to the role of the state in each case.

Unlike Obama however who chose the issue of healthcare as the transformative one that would define his first term in office, despite the fact that the budget and economy were looming large as potential roadblocks to his re-election, President Aquino hasn’t really staked his presidency on any signature issue, save for impeaching Mr Corona and jailing Mrs Arroyo.

In the case of Mr Aquino, the victories over the former chief justice and ex-president respectively start to ring hollow among his supporters who don’t necessarily see the anti-corruption campaign continuing in the future under Mr Aquino’s likely successors. For them, a set of insurance policies to mitigate against any potential backsliding is required but does not seem to be forthcoming from Mr Aquino’s current leadership (or lack thereof) when it comes to the Freedom of Information bill and other similar measures.

As they see the potential dominance of the Binays, Estradas and Pacquiaos in our national political landscape for years and years to come, many are also beginning to call for the fulfilment of the anti-dynasty provisions in the constitution. Again, it does not seem as though the president will be leading on this issue. For the “will of the people” to be fulfilled, no restriction ought to be placed on their choices, he would probably say.

That so called choice presupposes however that people are indeed free to decide on their own. The framers of our present constitution perhaps knew intuitively that for this to be so, people would need to have a certain level of economic freedom and independence. Until such was achieved, they must have felt certain restrictions needed to be in place. What Milner describes as the stabilising force is nothing but a healthy middle class.

Unlike President Obama who broke with economic orthodoxy by bailing out the auto-industry and giving subsidies to clean tech companies in the hope of saving and creating jobs with living wages, President Aquino and his team feel no need to intervene in the appreciation of the peso to support our manufacturing base which is needed to grow the middle class.

For Mr Aquino, the fact that he can demonstrate the ability of the ruling class to govern with a level of integrity ought to be enough to ensure that things never go back to the way they were under Mrs Arroyo. For his fellow dynasts who supported his candidacy and form part of his ruling coalition, however, the fact that Mr Aquino thinks this way guarantees that things will indeed go back to “business as usual” when they get their turn in the driver’s seat.

Childish and inutile

Nine associate justices snubbed the oath-taking of Chief Justice Sereno. Seven were not around for her first flag ceremony. Presumably, those justices wanted to demonstrate their disappointment and disapproval over the president’s disregard for the principle of seniority and Sereno’s willingness to abide by it. But, as demonstrations go, it was childish and inutile.

Sereno will remain chief justice for the next 18 years unless she resigns or is impeached, becomes incapacitated or dies. So unless the protesting justices can force her to quit or convince Congress to impeach her or if somehow they can incapacitate or kill her without getting caught, they will just have to live with the fact that she will remain their chief and none of them will ever head the Court.

For those associate justices who can’t live with Sereno and the “trashing” of the principle of seniority, former senator Rene Saguisag offered a suggestion, “To dramatize a passion for the principle of seniority, resign! As was done by Supreme Court Justice Florentino Torres in 1920 and my Evidence teacher, Court of Appeals Justice Pompeyo Diaz in 1954.” That’s the way mature and principled people behave.

Justices claim they hold dearly the practice of appointing the most senior justice to succeed an outgoing chief but evidence proves that they do not hold it as dearly as Justices Torres and Diaz.

Justice Reynato Puno did not resign when Gloria Arroyo skipped him for Justice Artemio Panganiban. He thought about it, he said, but he didn’t do it. Maybe the promise that he would succeed Panganiban after a year’s wait was good enough for him. Justice Antonio Carpio did not resign when Gloria Arroyo appointed Justice Renato Corona who was his junior. Now if Carpio could live with Corona then surely he can live with Sereno. Or is it a case of “Not once but twice!”

So what are these infantile associate justices going to do other than undermine their chief? Are they going to show their true colors and confirm once and for all the reason why out of all the thousands of lawyers qualified to serve as justices of the Supreme Court Gloria Arroyo handpicked them? Think about it. all things being equal, why were they chosen by Gloria? Read their decisions for the definitive answer.

Those justices should resign if only to demonstrate their respect for tradition. And the institution. They are not irreplacable. They are not the last bulwark against undemocratic tendencies if in fact there are any. They are not the finest examples of justice. In fact, as Arroyo appointees, they proved themselves champions of executive orders that not only gagged witnesses from testifying about anomalies but also as facilitators of Gloria Arroyo’s attempt to escape justice.

If those brats in robes are unhappy and unwilling to work then they should leave and make way for those who are willing to work their asses off to reform the judiciary and undo all the damage they have wrought. That’s the honorable thing to do, Your Honors. Rest assured none of you will be missed.

Goodbye and don’t let the door hit your asses on the way out.

The Straight Path Needs to Turn a Corner

Enter through the narrow gate. For wide is the gate and broad is the road that leads to destruction, and many enter through it. But small is the gate and narrow the road that leads to life, and only a few find it.

-Matthew 7:13-14

I am well aware that any discussion about Daang Matuwid (the righteous path aka The Path) the anti-corruption slogan of the administration ends up becoming a theological debate. That is why I am prepared to tread on this ground quite carefully. The term itself is a reference to the Sermon on the Mount performed by Jesus in the gospel of Matthew which is quoted above.

Those who approve of this analogy will say that it is a secular version of that moral principle. Those who disapprove will counter with another idiom, the one that states the road to hell is paved with good intentions. They will point to the underspending of the government (which persists to this day) which was motivated by a desire to rid public works of corruption that led to the rapid slowdown in the rate of economic growth (which will persist as well over the next two years).

Adherents to The Path will rebut this with another slogan, kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap (if there is no corruption, there will be no poverty). For them, it is not just a moral imperative to fight corruption, it is an economic one. The Path sceptics will quote a genuine Filipino proverb, kung walang tiyaga, walang nilaga (if you don’t persevere, expect no reward). The attention they say of the government has been distracted by chasing its enemies that it has lost track of the people’s real priorities.

Latest polling has been quite illuminating. While the public still assigns a net positive approval rating to the president, a majority or a plurality of them do not think he has done a good job of creating jobs, improving wages and preventing the rising cost of living. The salience of these bread and butter issues exceeds that of his anti-corruption campaign. In explaining why his performance rating is still good, one polling executive surmised that this was probably because compared to his predecessor the president still manages to come off smelling sweeter.

This brings me to my central point, that while the current dispensation may be perceived as being qualitatively different from its precedents, its implementation of daang matuwid still fails the test of sustainability. This becomes apparent when we make use of external comparisons (looking at cases from other countries) instead of internal ones (looking at cases from within our country).

Forget about comparing us to the advanced countries in Scandinavia and the North Atlantic. These nations have built up systems of good governance over several centuries, during which time they grew economically and became wealthy (some would say at the expense of their former colonies).

Forget about comparing us to East Asia (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan) and other Confucian-states (Singapore, Hong Kong, Mainland China, Thailand, Vietnam). These nations have had centuries’ worth of tradition involving bureaucracies infused with a meritocratic ethos.

Instead, let us look to Indonesia, a country with whom we share common ethnic origins and similar colonial and contemporary history.

Different Paths

Emil Bolongaita is an authority on Indonesia’s experience having advised donors to the Yudhoyono government on providing assistance to its Corruption Eradication Commission or KPK. He also provided support to the Philippine Ombudsman under Simeon Marcelo during the early days of the Arroyo government. He literally wrote the book for the World Bank on anti-corruption policy in Asia.

(Just in the interests of full disclosure: I met Emil back in high school when we were both student leaders in Jesuit institutions, he at the collegiate level, and I at the secondary level. Our paths crossed again when he took up a teaching position at Carnegie Mellon University, where I had completed a Master’s degree. He then went on to take up a role at the ADB in Manila.)

In a paper, entitled Exception to the Rule? Why Indonesia’s Anti-Corruption Commission succeeds while others don’t – a comparison with the Philippines, published in August 2010 shortly after the Aquino government was inaugurated into office, Emil traces the similarities and differences between the two countries’ experience in fighting corruption. The following similarities are worth noting in the outset:

  • Firstly, both countries experienced major economic upheaval and the collapse of long-standing dictatorial regimes that were characterized by widespread corruption and crony capitalism (in the rankings of the most corrupt rulers of all time, Presidents Soeharto and Marcos are placed first and second respectively). This was followed by the formation of pluralistic democracies. Transition to democracy however has not eliminated the system of patronage and clientelism in both countries.
  • Secondly, following democratic restoration, agencies were (re)created to deal with corruption—the KPK in Indonesia and the Ombudsman in the Philippines. These two institutions have the broadest mandate in both countries to receive complaints, investigate and prosecute suspects before special anti-corruption courts (the TIPOKOR in Indonesia and Sandiganbayan in the Philippines). They both are tasked with studying governance systems, identifying vulnerabilities and providing advice on corruption prevention and mitigation strategies. The KPK has the added task of monitoring the implementation of such strategies. In this sense, their scope of work is broader than the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) of Hong Kong and New South Wales (Australia) and that of the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) of Singapore whose mandates are confined to investigation.
  • Thirdly, both nations have similar levels of economic development as measured by per capita income and consequently also suffer from similar levels of perceived corruption as measured by normalised qualitative scores on corruption performed by Transparency International and the World Bank.

That is as far as the similarities go. According to Emil, the two systems diverge in terms of their performance, both qualitatively and quantitatively. He states that

In just five years, the KPK has successfully prosecuted over one hundred senior officials that before would have been considered as ‘untouchable’ by their positions and prominence. To date, the KPK has yet to lose a single case, either at the anti-corruption court or at the Supreme Court where the guilty verdicts of the TIPIKOR are appealed. In a country long perceived to be endemically corrupt, with a history of ‘untraceable’ anti-corruption performance, this accomplishment of the KPK is nothing short of extraordinary.

Emil notes further that

By comparison, the Ombudsman’s record is strikingly poor. With the notable exception of former President Joseph Estrada who was convicted of corruption in extraordinary circumstances … the highest ranking official convicted of corruption is at the level of governor; only two governors have been convicted but neither ultimately served time in prison (CENPEG 2006). Examining the records of the Sandiganbayan from 2001 to 2006, the same survey found that the conviction rate (including guilty plea) in the court was only 0.7%.

What accounts for such disparate results? Emil highlights seven factors involving the following:

  1. Jurisdiction (KPK covers the executive and legislature, but not the military, while the Ombudsman covers all offices except impeachable ones although the present office holder contends that this is not the case).
  2. Powers and capacities (KPK has the investigative powers of law enforcement agencies and can conduct wiretaps, examine bank accounts and tax records, freeze assets, issue hold orders and make arrests. The “toothless” Ombudsman has none of these powers).
  3. Operational differences (cooperation in the KPK between investigative and prosecutorial arms is not observed in the Ombudsman and the weight of evidence considered before filing a case is proof beyond reasonable doubt for the KPK, while it is only probable cause for the Ombudsman).
  4. Human resources (recruitment, selection and composition is more stringent under the KPK than the Ombudsman; consequently, they are able to achieve more with less staff).
  5. Performance measurement (objective measures for tracking and monitoring performance are more rigorous and widespread in the KPK).
  6. Accountable management (governance of KPK is handled by five commissioners acting in a collegial manner, while the Ombudsman is headed by one person).
  7. Anti-corruption courts (the adjudication process in the TIPOKOR takes about eight months on average, which includes the appeal process to the Supreme Court, while the process takes about 9.8 years in the Sandiganbayan including appeals to the Supreme Court; and, the effectivity of the sentence is immediate, even if under appeal in the case of the former, not in the case of the latter).

Beyond these specific design features, I would also suggest that what makes the Indonesian case of fighting corruption stronger than the Philippines is the underlying coherence of the state in the former, a point that I made in a previous post entitled Indonesia Rising, Philippines Waning. It should be noted however that despite its successes, recent events have cast doubt on whether the KPK will be able to perform its functions well into the future. Emil calls its history a “cautionary tale” in that within its successes lie the seeds of its own destruction.

Where to from here?

A number of obvious policy recommendations stand out from this comparative case analysis. For me the most salient ones have to do with expanding the investigative powers and prosecutorial capacities of the Ombudsman. Some of the ones Emil highlights which involve exempting select agencies within the bureaucracy from civil service compensation structures I have also discussed here.

The importance of winning cases based on the weight and integrity of the evidence has been highlighted by the impeachment trial of Chief Justice Corona and the “Hello Garci” incident involving former president Arroyo. In both cases, evidence involving bank accounts and wiretapped conversations cannot be admitted due to the illegal nature of obtaining them.

Similarly in the cases involving the prosecution of tax cheats and smugglers, the likelihood of conviction is quite low considering that the Department of Justice was not given sufficient funding to hire lawyers to dispose of its backlog. One wonders what sort of deterrent effect this will have.

For Emil, the litmus test for whether such reforms can succeed is the political support from the executive and legislature. He casts “serious doubts” on whether such structural transformations can occur by saying

(M)any executive officials and legislators are unlikely to welcome the idea of strengthening an agency that could pursue them for corruption.

Any reform he says needs “to be crafted to reflect the constraints and opportunities within the institutions and incentive structures that drive the Philippine political economy”. Mind you what constitutes self interest in this case is really in the eye of the beholder and defined by leaders who are in a position to shape such interests.

Gauging progress

The fact that the corruption perception index of the Indonesia or Philippines has improved recently is not an adequate benchmark for determining the success or failure of their respective reforms. Such qualitative measures merely reflect the overall perception of the panels peering into our world from the outside. While the government is to be congratulated for recent gains in tax and revenue collection, these are not the proper means for determining whether a structural shift has taken place or not.

To use a sports analogy, although the country has acquired a few star players in its team which has lifted its game somewhat, the way to ensure that such performance continues into the future when the star players have left is by playing the “long-game” by having a regimented player development program. Barcelona FC which is rated by many as the top football club in the world (recent events in La Primera Liga and UEFA Champions League notwithstanding) got to be where it is by instituting their way of playing “the beautiful game” decades ago.

The same thing has to occur in fighting graft and corruption in the Philippines. For this reason, the Righteous Path needs to turn a corner. Many of the structural and systemic proposals required have not even appeared on the policy agenda because good governance is not seen as a question of passing new laws, but of simply implementing existing ones.

Even assuming they did bubble up to the surface the enactment of such measures would be hindered for quite some time because the legislature is currently tied up ironically in the impeachment trial (or trails, if we are to believe recent pronouncements from the Palace). This makes the situation diabolically difficult for reformers to reach their destination for without the proper powers, tools and resources, how can they stick to The Righteous Path?

UPDATE: I forgot to disclose as well that it was my father, Noli who, as a delegate to the constitutional convention of 1971-73, sponsored a provision for the creation of an Ombudsman. The Tanodbayan was subsequently created by presidential decree by President Marcos. Its role was taken over by  the Office of the Special Prosecutor under the 1987 Constitution, and the Office of the Ombudsman was given the lead role to investigate complaints of corruption as the new Tanodbayan. My father tells me that the way the present Ombudsman is set-up and operates is not the way he originally intended it to be.

UPDATE 2: Despite these reservations, the third complaint filed with the Ombudsman against the Chief Justice was made by him.

Untrustworthy

That seems to be the label which the instigators of ‘memogate’ want to attach to the Vice President Jejomar Binay.

As the 2013 race for the senate heats up, members of the rival faction within the Palace opposing Jojo Binay have leaked a confidential memo he wrote to the president concerning a case involving corruption in the military. The advice contained in the memo was for the government to enter into a plea bargain deal with the former AFP comptroller General Carlos Garcia.

This mirrored the views of the office of the Ombudsman which at the time was held by Merceditas Gutierrez, Mrs Arroyo’s former justice secretary, who subsequently resigned as an impeachment case loomed against her in the Senate which was filed by palace supporters in the House incensed over her acceptance of the deal.

The tactic of the leakers is quite clear: make the public doubt Binay’s anti-Arroyo credentials, and by doing so, shed light on the fact that he too may have skeletons hidden in his closet. This follows news that the coalition headed by Binay and former president Joseph Estrada announced that it might field Arroyo allies not implicated in cases filed against her in their senatorial ticket come 2013.

Concerns over the integrity of the former mayor were conveniently swept under the rug during the heady days of the anti-Arroyo protest movement. Makati became a bastion of opposition in those days when most local government officials were allied with the administration of Mrs Arroyo. When the remains of former president Corazon Aquino were moved from La Salle Greenhills to Manila Cathedral, the cortege snaked through the streets of the central business district in recognition of the critical role it played as a staging ground for massive rallies.

What memogate reveals is the intention of loyalists associated with his political rival within the administration Secretary Mar Roxas to counter the vice president’s popularity by painting him with the same brush that tarnished Mrs Arroyo’s reputation by exposing his willingness to compromise with her on matters of principle that they deem sacrosanct. These insiders may have wanted the case against Garcia to proceed despite the weak and inadmissible evidence because of Mrs Arroyo’s alleged involvement in the “golden parachute” scheme involving large sums of money in exchange for military support for her government that the case had the potential to expose.

Reacting to an article about the incident reported on Rappler, which speculated on his potential motives for supporting the Ombudsman’s position (according to the report his wife had a pending case before her at the time), Binay called the media organization “reckless, irresponsible and malicious”.

Rappler for its part conceded that Binay got it right. The plea bargain was approved by the Sandiganbayan for lack of strong solid evidence. Although, the president and his allies in the house went to great lengths to reverse both the Ombudsman’s and the Sandiganbayan’s decisions, the general was only pinned down by the AFP for holding a green card to the US while in active service. He is currently serving a two year jail sentence for this infraction.

For his part, the vice president alleges that by making such sensitive deliberations ‘fair game’, the palace insiders have caused harm to the government. This is the fallout of such a propaganda war. By elevating narrow partisan interests above the national interest, these insiders have forgotten their role as custodians of the affairs of state.

On the other hand, such cannot be said of his ally Ernesto Maceda, a prospective senatorial candidate, who in a televised interview connected the case to remove Chief Justice Renato Corona from office with the electoral protest filed by Sec Roxas questioning the vice presidential election results of 2010. “With friends like these, who needs enemies,” the vice president must be saying to himself.

It appears this early that battle lines are already being drawn. The “knights of the round table” in Camelot are laying claim to the mantle of good governance and are intending to lump Binay along with the opposition that was comprised up to this point of Arroyo supporters. Binay on the other hand portrays them as saboteurs out to wreck the president’s effective governance of the nation.

The president for his part is not willing to make a split with his vice president an ‘inevitable’ proposition. He will after all need the support of his deputy in corralling votes in the senate for his proposals if indeed the vice president’s allies control a majority of the upper chamber as polling indicates they will.

The question now is whether the president can and would be able to control the machinations of those that serve in his team to prevent a dysfunction from setting in, if it hasn’t already.

Identity Matters

How the principle of “shared destiny” shapes the way voters behave.

image courtesy of hiphopwired.com

In the West, identity politics is often equated with minority interests. Barack Obama in 2008 won the presidential contest by refusing to campaign as a black candidate the way the Rev Jesse Jackson had attempted before him. Hillary Rodham Clinton on the other hand came close to shattering “that highest, hardest glass ceiling” but succeeded only in giving it “eighteen million cracks”.

Identity politics can also be used to wedge voters on social issues. Witness how Rick Santorum used it to stake out his claim over social conservatives in the Republican primaries this year. The problem with this strategy is that it often relegates a candidate to a non-mainstream status unable to appeal to a general electorate. But what should happen if the minority or disenfranchised group becomes the majority or mainstream the way the masa or lower income voter has become in the Philippines?

It was Joseph Ejercito Estrada who first harnessed this vote based on his cinematic role as a working class hero when he ran for and won a seat in the Senate back in 1988. Since then, he demonstrated just how potent it can be. One of the reasons identity is such a formidable force is due to the notion of having a “shared fate”. To forge this sense, symbolism, images and myth-making plays an important role. This is why rituals are so important for religious groups in forging a shared social identity.

It was not too long ago, 2009 to be exact, when the love affair between the Aquinos and the masses was reignited. Popular and religious ceremony following the death of Corazon Aquino created a shared sense of community. Not just that, but a line of succession from Noynoy to his vice presidential ticket mate Mar Roxas was established when the two shot to the top of the surveys in their respective candidacies.

Mayor Jejomar Binay entered the vice presidential race as a dark horse with former president Joseph “Erap” Estrada occupying “top billing” in their ticket. “Erap” elected in 1998 as president had been ejected from office in 2001 by an angry bourgeoisie mob who were now endorsing the Aquino-Roxas tandem. His continued popularity with the poor helped chisel away Manny Villar’s edge over Aquino with these target voters. Villar’s chances collapsed once it was revealed that his claims of humble origins were not credible.

It is quite puzzling, but in an election year dominated by the protest vote, why was it that Estrada continued to garner such wide popular support despite his previous conviction for plunder which was the same accusation made against Gloria Arroyo?

Simply put, for the poor, the word corruption has different meanings depending on the context in which it is used. In the context of Arroyo’s presidency, corruption was all about her stealing the office of the president from “Erap” through people power forged by the bourgeoisie and subsequently from Fernando Poe, Jr. through electoral fraud. Enriching her family while in office was the sole motivation in their minds for doing such dastardly deeds.

In the context of Estrada’s presidency, the poor did not see corruption in quite the same terms. They did not equate his presidency with corruption the way the more affluent middle and upper classes did. Mr Estrada’s concern for the poor was seen as his overriding motive. If he stole at all, it was not from the public coffers, and he only did so in order to help the poor even more. As his former budget secretary maintains to this day, his administration was decidedly pro-poor in its allocation of resources.

In short, Erap was used as a scapegoat by the elite for their own moral failings, while Gloria never could share that sense of shared destiny with the poor the way he had.

For this reason, Erap could not fathom a coalition with the middle forces knowing what their mental frame was. Binay himself often confronted these same interest groups as the mayor of Makati, the country’s premier business district. They had wanted him out for years and campaigned against him in several electoral cycles.

Despite allegations made by Makati’s elite of Mr Binay’s dodgy practices, the city he managed consistently topped the nation in terms of literacy and health. He demonstrated through the years his sense of shared fate with the poor who have benefited from his administration. This unique selling point and the relentless campaign that he ran allowed him to win the vice presidential derby with a razor thin margin.

At the national level, Mrs Arroyo had contended with these same business groups who had wanted her out for betraying the mandate they had bestowed on her to institute “good governance”. She who had once been quite popular with the masses would never be forgiven for knifing not one but two of their champions in the persons of “Pareng Erap” and FPJ in the back.

Having stumbled down the slippery slope of transactional politics in a bid to win back the masses, Mrs Arroyo found neither favour with them nor with her bourgeoisie patrons, the Aquinos being chief among them. The schism that erupted between their two houses threatened to disable her government. She then resorted to nearly despotic rule to complete her term of office.

Having suffered a backlash for turning against Mrs Arroyo and joining the Estrada/FPJ camp, the Aquinos once again endeared themselves to the masses whose sympathy was translated into an electoral avalanche. They who represented the best virtues of their class through their altruistic sacrifice once again rode a wave of euphoria into office.

Although the vice presidential contest was a mere sideshow to the main spectacle, its outcome has turned out to be significant. Instead of concentrating power in the hands of the bourgeoisie, the masses chose to hedge their bets, and rightly so.

Split identities

While President Aquino has remained wedded to the same neoliberal economic principles of low taxes, less government and less spending, which his mother had adhered to to please the bond market, Mr Binay does not appear to hold the same attachment.

Take the case of mass housing for instance. The vice president has called on the government to tap into the foreign currency stock that the country has amassed largely owing to the OFW or overseas Filipino worker phenomenon to fund a mass housing construction boom. This would seem logical and fair given that one of the first things OFWs invest in is housing for their families.

Tapping our foreign reserves, as I have said many times would stem the rise of the peso because much of the spending would leak externally through imported materials for construction, at least initially. This would give our manufacturing sector and dollar earning OFWs some space to breathe instead of giving the bourgeoisie license to go on overseas trips and purchase luxury goods from abroad.

In the medium term, local manufacturers of cement, iron and steel could expand their productive capacity to replace imports leading to an investment boom. This method of pump priming the economy, however, is contrary to the method applied by PNoy’s economic managers who in their first year and a half applied “Aquinomics” by contracting fiscal spending to “crowd-in” private investment. The formula did not work and is partly to blame for the “noynoying” tag assigned to the administration (the IMF outlook sees the Philippines once again lagging behind in ASEAN for the next two years).

In the case of rolling back the value added tax rate on petrol, the vice president has said that he differs with PNoy in that he is in favour of it. Binay is demonstrating through these nuanced approaches that unlike the president’s fervent adherence to economic rationalism, he only wants to find pragmatic solutions for the country’s poor.

Recall that in the latter part of Corazon Aquino’s term of office, when the power crisis raged in Luzon, the public had grown weary of her inability to govern the market. The same could be happening today. The president’s mantra that the power sector has to be liberalized and privatized in order to be stabilized will lead to higher rates and cost his allies votes in Mindanao.

The politically savvy Binay has sought to capitalize on this by having a “united Mindanao” represented by Miguel Zubiri and Aquilino “Koko” Pimentel in his senatorial line-up. With Pulse Asia showing Binay’s endorsement being the most potent among political backers, he believes that he can lock-in the Mindanao vote by uniting these warring camps. The island will be crucial in winning the 2016 election.

PNoy on the other hand has doused speculation fed by his own deputy spokesperson that a split with the vice president is “inevitable”. Just like his mother before him, PNoy has chosen to remain “above the fray” and not endorse the nominee of the party of which he is titular head as Roxas intimated he no longer wants to seek the presidency but will be at the disposal of his party. He seems to have lost the will to fight.

Binay in turn will have Sen Jinggoy Estrada as his vice president and “people’s champ” Rep Manny Pacquiao who is expected to run for governor in 2013 in his senatorial line-up in 2016. This in turn will make an Estrada-Pacquiao tandem likely in 2022 followed by a Pacquiao-Binay, Jr ticket in 2028. The pattern set by Estrada, Sr will it seems be replicated by them.

The triumph of the parties that are closely aligned with the masses means that the ruling Liberal Party and its bourgeoisie/elite constituency could be on the periphery of power for years and years to come. The affair with the masses seems well and truly over.

So what should the Liberal Party do?

If I were in their shoes, I would work doubly hard to recruit members of the electorate that comprise the masses to join their party. Identifying genuine champions of the poor with solid track records and attracting them should be their number one priority at this point. It might be an NGO leader who works in the rural or urban poor community or a highly successful social entrepreneur whose innovations have changed lives. By assembling such a collection of individuals, the LP could change the nature of the game and translate their present weakness into their strength.

They have nothing to lose. If they apply a normal, traditional political strategy, they will fail anyway. At least if they go with something new and daring, they will win a major victory in terms of institutional renewal. Even if their candidates come within striking distance of the winner’s circle, that would still be seen as a victory for new, non-traditional politics at the national level.

By redefining their identity, they will also redefine the identity of the Binay led UNA coalition. This strategy is admittedly quite bold and risky, but that is the whole point. It would take the nation by surprise. The fact that it would be attempted by a major political party let alone the ruling party would be completely unheard of and might force voters for the first time to assess candidates based on their platform rather than popularity.

But in order for the LP to execute this strategy, it will have to get to work straight away by conducting a thorough search for prospective candidates, building up their public profile and supporting their campaigns. Only after the party has built a sense of shared destiny with the broad masses of the population will it be able to mount a serious challenge to the mammoth support enjoyed by the opposing mob.

Their ultimate goal is not only to shape the identity of their party but that of the voters, too. If voters are given a non-choice of picking candidates cut from the same cloth, then they will choose to clothe themselves with the ones that offer “winning appeal”. That shapes the identity of the voter as someone who merely follows the herd. If on the other hand they are offered a genuine alternative, they may just surprise us on election day.

DPWH cancels 19 ‘midnight deals’ worth over P934M

DPWH cancels 19 ‘midnight deals’ worth over P934M

By Jerry E. Esplanada
Philippine Daily Inquirer

MANILA, Philippines—Citing the Aquino administration’s policy of transparency and accountability, Public Works Secretary Rogelio Singson has ordered the cancellation of 19 “midnight deals” entered into by the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH).

The contracts, worth over P934 million, for the rehabilitation of provinces affected by Storms “Ondoy” (international codename: Ketsana) and “Pepeng” (Parma) are supposed to be funded by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA).

He said proper procedures were clearly violated as the projects did not undergo “open and competitive” public bidding.

“Aside from being negotiated, the contracts were signed even before their SARO (special allotment release orders) were released by the Department of Budget and Management. That’s quite irregular,” he said.

“They were signed just a few days before July 1 (Day 1 of the Aquino administration),” Singson told the Inquirer.

JICA earlier agreed to finance 86 projects worth over P3 billion in areas in Regions 1 to 5 severely damaged by the two storms.

A check with DPWH files showed the contracts were signed on June 18 while their SAROs were released on June 25.

“Why should you sign contracts when you’re not authorized?” Singson asked.

Probe of DPWH officials

He has formed a team tasked with conducting a thorough investigation of the canceled contracts and the DPWH officials behind them.

The “contract packages,” which are part of the DPWH’s Post-Ondoy and Pepeng Short-Term Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project, included the following (with their respective project costs, locations and contractors):

• No. 10: P53.06 million; La Trinidad, Bokod, Itogon and Buguias, Benguet; Sabangan, Mountain Province and Tabuk, Kalinga; Ferdstar Builders Contractors.

• No. 13: P35.1 million; Ilocos Norte; A. de GuiaConstruction.

• No. 24: P91.5 million; Sitio Departe, Barangay Bantog, Asingan, Pangasinan; Tokwing Construction.

• No. 25: P228.7 million; Sitio Bato, Barangay San Vicente, San Manuel, Pangasinan; Northern Builders.

• No. 27: P25.8 million; Camalaniogan and Sta. Praxedes, Cagayan; M. M. Construction.

• No. 28: P68.6 million; Paitan Section Bay and Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya; Royal Crown Monarch Construction and Supply.

• No. 30: P27.4 million; Sta. Fe, Kayapa and Dupax del Sur, Nueva Vizcaya; Christian Ian Construction Corp.

• No. 36: P9.14 million; Paombong and San Jose del Monte City, Bulacan; P.O.N. Construction.

• No. 37: P41.1 million; Bulacan province; Northern Builders.

• No. 39: P42.5 million; San Felipe and Iba, Zambales; Tokwing Construction.

• No. 40: P19.2 million; San Marcelino, Zambales; Arrowhead Construction.

• No. 41: P77.3 million; Arayat, Pampanga; L.R. Tiqui Builders, Inc.

• No. 44: P78.7 million; Candaba, Pampanga; Northern Builders.

• No. 45: P27.4 million; Barangay Bodega, Floridablanca, Pampanga; Northern Builders.

• No. 46: P16.4 million; Guagua and Lubao, Pampanga; L.R. Tiqui Builders, Inc.

• Nos. 47-A and 47-B: P32.01 million; Moncada and Bamban, Tarlac; R.A. Pahati Gravel and Sand and LSD Construction and Supplies.

• No. 48: P18.3 million; Aliaga, Nueva Ecija; L.R. Tiqui Builders Inc.

• No. 49: P19.1 million; Bongabon and San Leonardo, Nueva Ecija; Royal Crown Monarch Construction and Supply.

• No. 51: P22.4 million; Balayan and Lemery, Batangas; A.D. Construction.

Need for transparency

Singson repeatedly stressed the need to be “very transparent and objective in project selection, bidding and awarding of projects.”

“I will seek and even plead for the cooperation of members of Congress, politicians and local government units to help us in ensuring the integrity and transparency of all public works projects,” he said.

He vowed to lead by example.

“This is what I told President Aquino when I accepted this position … I realize that we also have to change how contractors, suppliers and elected officials deal with DPWH,” Singson said.

He warned DPWH personnel against acting as “middlemen and collectors for contractors, politicians and other questionable personalities.”

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