East Asia

When Good Governance Isn’t “Good Enough”

MRTaccident

Four years under an honest, sincere leader like President Noynoy Aquino (PNoy), and the mood of the nation has palpably shifted, from one of hope and optimism that greeted his election in 2010, to one of fear and loathing at the prospects in 2016 when he is supposed to step down (talks of lifting his term limit notwithstanding).

Four years is a sufficiently long time to take stock of how far down the path of good governance (daang matuwid) PNoy has taken the nation. The opinion polls suggest that while an absolute majority still are satisfied with his performance, fewer and fewer people think he is succeeding or doing a good job. If this trend continues, the people who rate him poorly may become the majority.

In his last State of the Nation Address, PNoy acknowledged that the task of reforming institutions in the country will not be completed by the end of his term. By the government’s own scorecard, the administration is failing in all but one of the Worldwide Governance Indicators of the World Bank, the global benchmark for good governance, nor is it expecting to achieve its governance goals by the end of PNoy’s term in office.

When it comes to achieving inclusive growth and development, regarded by many as the holy grail of good governance, for which it is just a means (kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap), slow progress indicates the intransigence of the situation. Poverty incidence and unemployment rates remain stubbornly high, despite the uptick of our GDP growth figures for over a decade now.

In this context, where does blame lie? Were the actions taken by the administration towards implementing good governance the right ones? To answer these questions, we will need to retrace its steps. But before that, let us first lay the foundation for the analysis.

The role of any government is always two-fold: to expand the productive sectors of its economy, and to invest in human capital while providing social and environmental safety nets for those who slip between the cracks.

A government cannot raise enough revenue to perform the latter, unless it performs the former really well. Inclusive development is premised on rapid, robust, and sustained growth taking place. The benefits of growth are often distributed unevenly though, so governments often need to step in to spread them more equitably across society.

Some minimum standards of competence and probity need to exist for a government to perform these functions well. In developing and emerging economies, these tasks are made more complicated due to the limited nature of available resources, weak organizational capacity and poor institutional integrity. But as demonstrated by East Asia in the last century and now by Sub-Saharan Africa in the early part of this century, governments need not be whiter than the falling snow to perform these functions well enough.

Retracing steps

Early in his administration, the president was concerned about changing the atmospherics to promote good governance, which was what he rightly perceived as his mandate from the Filipino people. He sought to achieve this by:

–          Replacing Mrs. Arroyo’s appointees and going after his predecessor through the courts. This was achieved with a series of executive orders, impeachment complaints and charges being filed. When the PDAF and DAP controversies broke, this extended to filing cases against incumbent legislators, such as senators Juan Ponce Enrile, Jinggoy Estrada and Ramon ‘Bong’ Revilla.

–          Improving the integrity, efficiency and effectiveness of the government’s expenditure program through reforms in the Department of Public Works and Highways and Department of Budget and Management. Corollary to this was making the budget process, the bidding and awarding of contracts, more transparent and accountable.

–          Improving the collection efficiency of revenue agencies such as the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Bureau of Customs, and government owned and controlled corporations by going after tax cheats and smugglers, reforming the governance of corporate boards and initiating a performance based bonus system.

In all this, the administration has actually been quite successful in getting what it wanted. Mrs. Arroyo is under hospital arrest; the Chief Justice appointed by her was impeached and convicted; her Ombudsman resigned; and, the three senators mentioned have been suspended and are in detention. New budget and procurement procedures are now in place. Collections and dividends from revenue generating agencies and corporations are up, meaning to say their performance is improving.

So what has the administration done wrong? Why are its approval ratings going down now despite its many accomplishments in the area of good governance? I would like to go beyond just the immediate causes to offer three fundamental problems. Three things, which I believe the administration is guilty of—they are:

  1. Focusing too much on reforming the government’s budget and expenditure processes and not enough on a whole-of-economy policy agenda.
  2. Focusing too much on the process of good governance and not enough on the ultimate, end-goals or outcomes of good governance.
  3. Not being bold, or forward-looking enough in its plans and vision for the country.

Let us tackle these one-by-one.

On the first point, the administration, by focusing on the efficiency of the government’s expenditures, limited itself to influencing a mere 20% of GDP that the annual budget represents. Economic policies, which affect 100% of the economy, on the other hand, have been neglected, to say the least. Just consider the following:

–          We are facing an imminent energy shortage, despite paying some of the highest electricity rates in the region. Some parts of the country are already experiencing regular, rotating blackouts.

–          We are facing a logistics and ports crisis, with freight landing but remaining inside Manila’s container port due to regulatory bottlenecks at the national level, which have led to unlicensed trucks being apprehended by the city of Manila. This crisis in Manila is going on despite the excess capacity that exists in Batangas and Subic Bay ports.

–          Our urban roads are congested limiting the flow of people and goods around the city, impacting on our productivity and the cost of delivering basic goods and services.

–          The metropolis suffers from a lack of urban planning, co-ordination and integration with surrounding regions.

–          We are paying some of the highest rates for internet and telecommunications services, and suffering from one of the slowest internet bandwidth speeds and poor connectivity in the region.

–          The NAIA, our most important gateway to the world, is considered one of the worst airports. Even the opening of an extra runway in Sangley Point a few years from now will simply ease congestion slightly.

–          The MRT and LRT systems are hampered frequently with accidents and breakdowns.

–          Our public transport system is not safe for the riding public or motorists.

–          Pollution is choking the city, leading to health risks and higher health bills.

–          Our higher educational institutions continue to slide down global league tables and a lower proportion of their graduates succeed in passing their professional licensure exams.

–          The sleeper issue is water. Will there be enough of it with all the growth happening in our urban centers?

Now energy, ports, communications, transport, roads, clean air and water, education and skills all affect the efficiency and productive capacity of our economy. If regulatory and line agencies lack the capability to independently plan, manage, monitor and guide the players that operate in these sectors in line with national development goals, then the future growth of the economy will be significantly constricted.

‘Plan rational’ missing

If a government cannot develop what the late-Chalmers Johnson called a “plan rational” for growing productive sectors in the economy and use its economic agencies to effectively line up the players in their respective spheres of influence to attain the targets of this plan, then it won’t achieve the kind of growth that results in massive improvements in its people’s quality of life.

The administration has identified the business process outsourcing, electronics, semiconductor, logistics, tourism, manufacturing and agro-industrial sectors for growth, and yet if you look at the basic infrastructure needed to power them forward, which includes human capital and skills, the policy frameworks are not providing a conducive environment for this to be a sustainable future.

Over-processed, under-performing

On the second point, the administration has focused too much on the process of good governance, not enough on the outcome. PNoy has focused on cleaning up the bureaucracy of corruption, institutionalizing right procedures of governance, and improving transparency and accountability.

Those are noble things, worth pursuing no doubt. However, in seeking to improve the processes by which the state governs society and the economy, it should not neglect to forge effective tools with which to improve the outcomes of processes without having to clean up the system, entirely.

As the only entity in society with the right to grant licenses, franchises, monopolies and provide public goods, the government actually has some clout to shape the economic landscape if it wanted to. It can direct state resources, finances and act as guarantor to projects that it sees as strategic in nature.

During East Asia’s rapid rise to prosperity, bureaucrats would grant loans at concessionary rates and issue licenses to operate in strategic sectors of the economy to favored companies. In return, they or their political masters would often receive commissions for facilitating these transactions that would go to their political machineries. They were, in this respect, no different from our own bureaucrats.

The only distinction lies in the fact that the recipients of such cheap loans and coveted licenses were obligated to produce results in line with national development targets. If they failed to achieve these performance standards, bureaucrats would wield the stick to rein them in, i.e. loans would be retracted or they would be forced to consolidate or be threatened with the entry of new players. The economic agencies had the tools and acted cohesively to do this.

In the Philippines, we have neglected to develop such tools and organizational cohesiveness. If we had a national policy to increase the average speed of our internet service, for instance, and the current providers were not meeting this target, then our regulators should have the power and authority to slap hefty fines and penalties on them, threaten to suspend their licenses or bring in new players from abroad. The targets should be easy to measure and verify, clearly defined and pre-agreed.

The same should apply elsewhere. Of course, the constitution might stand in the way of some policy tools, such as liberalizing foreign ownership in certain sectors. The problem with full liberalization for its own sake though is that if you continue to have weak agencies without the tools to shape the behavior of players in the market, we could simply end up with foreign players behaving just as badly as local ones. Having said that, all options must be on the table.

The government through its budget process has started to initiate performance based budgeting, which is focused not just on how much gets spent or what outputs are produced, but the outcomes it achieves. This is a positive step. The next logical one would be to empower agencies with the right policy tools to achieve the desired outcomes.

Bolder vision, action-oriented focus needed

On the third and final point, if the government is not bold or forward-looking enough in its plans and vision for the country, then it follows that the agencies which develop policies and regulations for the economy will not be ambitious or strategic enough in wielding the tools for shaping its future. Without a national agenda, agencies will be more susceptible to being ‘captured’ by narrow, vested interests.

Of course the government has developed targets in the Philippine Development Plan. The question here is whether these are the right targets needed to develop a grand vision and narrative for where the country should be heading. Are they bold and forward-looking enough? Are they outcomes-based as opposed to being outputs- or even process-based?

In my view, many of the targets in the Plan remain output-oriented. What matters to the broader public is not how many passengers go through Ninoy Aquino International Airport, for instance, but how comfortable and easy it is for them to do so. There ought to be measures that monitor and track this. There could be 40 million passengers going through NAIA by 2016 as per the plan’s target, but they could all be unsatisfied and disgruntled with the service.

A more visionary target would have been to open a new airport by 2016 to service the expected inflow of passengers into Metro Manila. If the government had come into office with this as a bold target, then agencies and investors would have known what to do and where to invest their resources. The same could have occurred in power.

If the government came in and said we needed to produce X additional megawatts by 2016 and to lower the average cost by Y per cent, while reducing greenhouse gases by Z tons, and empowered responsible agencies with the mandate, resources and tools to get it done, we could have avoided the current situation. I believe dissatisfaction among many citizens stems from the impression, rightly or wrongly, that government just does not have a plan to solve their everyday problems.

When President John F. Kennedy in 1961 set a bold, long-range vision and asked for extra appropriations from the US Congress to put a man on the moon by the end of the decade, no one at that point knew how it could be achieved. There were no feasibility studies. The technology was not even available. NASA had to learn by doing, taking action that brought them closer to that vision through experimentation and adapting their plans and organization accordingly.

The many challenges facing our country are adaptive in nature. Intergenerational poverty, climate change and conflict ridden communities: the solutions to these problems are not known in advance. Even experts are confounded when they apply their current state of the art tools. But that should not deter our leaders from framing a bold and inspiring vision for the future, and to set the scene for government, clients and stakeholders to collaborate in finding a unique way forward.

Good (or “good enough”) governance?

As PNoy enters the final third of his time in office, the clock seems to be ticking much faster. People have 2016 on their minds. What he needs to do now is race to the finish line. As he contemplates the legacy that his government will leave behind, he may need to re-think his agenda thoroughly.

While pursuing anti-corruption and good governance is a laudable goal, admittedly it takes several presidential terms, decades even, before this can be fully accomplished. His government has taken many positive steps down this path, and should be commended for it, but as he himself acknowledged in his penultimate state of the nation address, the journey will not end when he steps down.

Given that good governance in its strictest sense will not be achieved during the life-time of his administration, what steps can he take now to achieve better outcomes in many policy areas that directly impact the lives of residents and ratepayers, and will affect the future growth potential of the country?

These steps, when taken, would constitute “good enough” governance, because the process for achieving outcomes may not be perfect, but at least they will allow the government to perform its primary role of expanding the economic base, and with it the capacity to address social disadvantage and environmental damage.

Once the economy has expanded sufficiently, government will be able to raise more revenue, and shall have more resources, which will allow it to continue down the road of good governance and inclusive development.

If the government fails to lift the standard of our economic infrastructure, then growth could stall, and many of the positive steps this government has taken so far might falter as well. When that happens disillusionment might set in, and many of the reforms initiated by PNoy might be wound back.

Finally, the citizenry, for its part, cannot wait decades (or even another term for that matter) before the promise of good governance is achieved, nor should they be made to wait. Four years under PNoy may have already taught them that the path of good governance is just too long and arduous. Their growing dissatisfaction with the results is a sure and telling sign that, as far as they are concerned, good governance simply isn’t good enough.

Close-Open

What’s better for economic growth?

In the debate over the economic provisions of the constitution, we often hear that it would be better for the Philippines to lift all restrictions on foreigners. These are what prevent investments from flooding into the country, its advocates say.

One way of arguing for full liberalisation is to point to our progressive regional neighbours and say that they are less restrictive towards foreign participation in their domestic markets. Since they are growing much faster through investments, what we ought to do is adopt their policies and completely liberalise all the sectors of our economy.

This notion is often repeated and reinforced by politicians, businessmen, think tanks and commentators in the media. They portray opposition to full investment liberalisation as either based on selfish interests or irrational xenophobia.

The problem with this stylised argument is that it may not necessarily be grounded on fact. It could be a situation where a lie repeated often enough can become true in the minds of the public.

To test the assumption that our regional neighbours are not restrictive towards foreign investments, I consulted the World Bank’s Invest Across Borders report which contains the most authoritative information on statutory rules and regulations that govern foreign investment in domestic economies around the world.

This allowed me to answer the question, which region in the world is the most open to foreign direct investments? Is it:

a. East Asia and the Pacific (EAP)

b. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA)

c. Latin America and the Caribbean (LATAM&C)

d. Eastern Europe and Central Asia (EECA)

e. South Asia (SA)

f. Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)

g. High income OECD nations (OECD)

Most would rank the OECD nations as the least restrictive followed by East Asia and the Pacific. This is based on the notion that richer and more prosperous countries generally tend to be more open to investment from abroad. No other region in the world has bridged the gap between rich and poor like EAP with MENA coming in second.

So what does the data tell us? The rich OECD countries are definitely the most open to foreign investments. But among all these regions, the EAP region is astonishingly the most restrictive. The following table comes straight from the World Bank’s findings:

Ownership Limits for Foreign Investors by Sector

Region/Economy Mining, oil & gas Agriculture & forestry Light manufact-uring Telecom Electricity Banking Insurance Transport Media Construction, tourism & retail Health care & waste manage-ment
East Asia & Pacific 78.4 82.9 86.8 64.9 75.8 76.1 80.9 66 36.1 93.4 84.1
Middle East & North Africa 78.8 100 95 84 68.5 82 92 63.2 70 94.9 90
South Asia 88 90 96.3 94.8 94.3 87.2 75.4 79.8 68 96.7 100
Latin America & Caribbean 91 96.4 100 94.5 82.5 96.4 96.4 80.8 73.1 100 96.4
Sub-Saharan Africa 95.2 97.6 98.6 84.1 90.5 84.7 87.3 86.6 69.9 97.6 100
Eastern Europe & Central Asia 96.2 97.5 98.5 96.2 96.4 100 94.9 84 73.1 100 100
High-income OECD 100 100 93.8 89.9 88 97.1 100 69.2 73.3 100 91.7

Source: World Bank (2010), Invest Across Borders.

Note: The table shows the average levels of ownership caps placed on foreign investors across eleven of the most regulated sectors (with a score of 100 indicating complete openness or full foreign ownership permitted). There were 87 countries in the sample.

For all but two of the eleven sectors featured, EAP is the most restrictive—and even in the case of those two sectors, electricity and transport, EAP came second only to MENA. The IAB report acknowledges this by saying,

East Asia and the Pacific has more restrictions on foreign equity ownership in all sectors than any other region.

The caveat is that EAP also shows the greatest intraregional variance with less populated jurisdictions like Singapore and the Solomon Islands having fewer restrictions and highly populated ones like China and Indonesia imposing more in their service sectors.

When it comes to private ownership of land, the IAB report also shows EAP being the most restrictive to foreigners. The following is a screen grab. It shows that only 33 per cent of the EAP’s economies allow foreign ownership of land compared to 52 per cent for SSA, 80 per cent for MENA and SA, 95 per cent for EECE and 100 per cent for LATAM&C and OECD. Only three of the ten economies surveyed allow it. Most economies only lease land to foreigners and provide weak lease rights at that (the leases cannot be used as collateral for loans, subdivided or sublet).

land ownership

When it comes to ownership rights, EAP scored 83.3 out of 100 coming in fifth after the OECD (100), LATAM&C (98.2), EECE (97.6) and SA (93.8), ahead of SSA (77.3) and MENA (68.8). This again runs counter to the prevailing view that EAP provides greater security to foreign investors over their property rights, more than other regions.

The ease of doing business, particularly the cost of entering a country is the last thing we will look at. The ease of establishment is measured by the number of steps and length of time needed for setting up a foreign business. The following table also comes from the IAB website:

Starting a Foreign Business

Region/Economy Procedures (number) Time (days) Ease of establishment index (0-100)
Middle East & North Africa 9 19 58.6
High-income OECD 9 21 77.8
Eastern Europe & Central Asia 8 22 76.8
South Asia 9 39 62.5
Sub-Saharan Africa 10 48 51.5
East Asia & Pacific 11 64 57.4
Latin America & Caribbean 14 74 62.

Note: Ease of establishment index (0-100) evaluates the regulatory regime for business start-up.

MENA and the OECD are at the top of the league table with 19 and 21 days for each of them respectively to open a new business. LATAM&C and EAP are the worst performers in that order providing additional hurdles to them. It takes 64 days on average in EAP and 11 steps to open a new business. In China it takes 65 days on average and 18 steps, which is above the regional average. In the ease of establishment index which reflects the regulatory regime of regions, SSA and EAP are the worst performers in that order, meaning their regulatory regimes are the most difficult and least familiar to foreign firms.

Given its lack of openess, poor accessibility of industrial land, and larger regulatory burden, it is astonishing how the EAP experienced faster growth and pulled in larger investments compared to other emerging markets in the world as shown in the following charts.

These results will seem counterintuitive, especially for those who have been fed a steady staple of neoliberal ideology. It’s a case of empirical evidence contradicting normative beliefs: the most restrictive EAP region grew fastest and attracted the greatest value of foreign direct investments.

So why has the Philippines managed to lag behind its regional neighbours in terms of growth and development? What factors allowed them to take-off and overtake us? That is a subject for a much longer conversation and a later post. Suffice it to say that framing the problem around liberalisation in certain sectors, accessibility to land, ease of establishment or even property rights does not provide a convincing answer.

Let me conclude with what that this discussion demonstrates, and that is opening up our domestic market to foreign competitors is not a guaranteed way to bring about economic transformation. It is not a panacea. It does not necessarily follow that if you open up, you will attract more investments or grow much faster. There is a missing ingredient in all this, an “omitted variable”, as it were.

In part two of this series, I will discuss the various strategies employed by the East Asian tigers in their quest for economic prosperity and how the political and economic history of the region diverges from common public perceptions of what happened.

The Tyrrany of Cousins

Altruism towards other people of the same blood-line is widely practiced and literally embedded in our DNA. The Hamilton Rule named after the British evolutionary biologist William Hamilton states that we are pre-disposed to behave altruistically to those with with whom we share a greater proportion of genes. This biological imperative to pass on our genetic code to the next generation is quite powerful.

Hunter gatherer societies tended to exhibit a high degree of inter-locking marriages based on kinship. Alliances between tribes were sealed through bridal exchange allowing genes to be distributed across a wider area. This had implications for early rulers and states. As agricultural societies gew within a defined space, its rulers found it more and more difficult to govern independently sufferering what is called the “tyranny of cousins” which puts the needs of the tribe above the rest.

China is credited with forming the first modern state to address this problem. The Qin and Han dynasties (221 BCE-220 CE) instituted a civil service staffed based on a rigorous examinations process. It was tasked with raising taxes used to secure the populace against enemy invasion or domestic exploitation as distinct from local lords who extracted rents from their serfs. China’s political history from then on can be told on the basis of how this tension arose between the state and elite families. Following a few “bad emperors” it eventually succumbed to repatrimonialization.

Medieval Islamic rulers sought to counteract tribal rivalry by erecting a warrior caste made up of slaves. The Mamluk slave warriors and their Ottoman Janissary counterparts were responsible for the administration and protection of Islamic civilization because they acted as a coherent ruling class looking after the broader interests of society and not any one particular tribe. Just as in China, however, the integrity of this institution began to erode over time.

Altruism based on reciprocal relationships rather than kinship played an active role in the modernization of East Asia. The Japanese keiretsus were organized on the basis of inter-locking boards led by former bureaucrats who were parachuted into senior executive positions. Korean chaebols had a reciprocal relationship with state finance and grew into large corporate family-owned entities with high debt-equity ratios. The management style of these conglomerates was based on consensus between parties. Life-time employment was the norm.

In communist China, investors partnered with local Township and Village Enterprises to gain access and participation in China’s economy. Going to bed with local governments protected assets from expropriation for as long as they continued to reciprocate with profitable performance. There was no formal recognition of property rights or an independent judiciary to enforce contracts, just a tacit agreement based on reciprocity and credible commitment based on mutual interest.

Guanxi a term denoting close networks has been behind informal credit markets supplying start-up capital to Chinese entrepreneurs the world over. Again, no formal agreements eforceable through the courts operates here. Trade and credit has been made possible through closely linked networks built on family and kin relations or reciprocal relationships based on one’s honor and reputation.

From trust to contracts

The West took a very different more protracted route. After the conversion of Germanic tribes to Christianity in the sixth century, the church promoted changes to interlocking marriages based on kinship. This tended to weaken in the long-run political and economic ties based on kin selection. They moved away from trust to contracts through the centuries.

In the twelfth century the English common law administered by the king’s court to which subjects could appeal the decisions of local lords established a system known as “the rule of law” to which eventually even the monarch was made subject by the nobles who feared expropriation by the state. Contracts became enforceable and property rights made more secure without the need for personal connections or networks.

Across the English Channel, the Dutch established the first stock exchange in the early seventeenth century. This made corporate management distinct from its owners and spread risk through tradable certificates lowering their average exposure and leading firms (such as the Dutch East India Company) to be less conservative in business expansion. Capital-raising went through an impersonal market rather than through personal networks.

Management in the West tended to be more individualistic than consensual motivated by incentives rather than trust. Short-term, risk-taking behavior leading to rich rewards and bonuses became more prevalent. Maintaining reputation continued to be important, but only in terms of improving one’s value in the impersonal labor market rather than protecting one’s “word of honor” within a tightly knit community.

Where to begin?

The Philippines is obviously stuck in transition. Many formal institutions have been transplanted from the West, but they remain weak and porous to the tyranny of cousins. It has been difficult for a strong central state to emerge where one’s loyalty to the country ends where one’s loyalty to one’s family begins. The thick network of kumpadres, kamag-anak, and kaibigan (now augmented by kaklase, kabarkada and kabarilan) makes it difficulty to determine where to even begin the reform process.

Getting to Denmark” is the problem to be grappled with: how to emulate Scandinavia which has the highest levels of human development and cleanest governments in the world. It almost sounds tautological. In order to gain the living standards of the West, we need to adopt their political and economic institutions including a strong state, rule of law and democratic accountability. If our society had the means to create and maintain such institutions, it wouldn’t be poor to begin with.

Earlier in a separate post, I commented on the preponderance of avowed bachelors or males with no offspring holding sensitive posts in the current government, the president being one of them. This harks back to the time of Mamluks, Jannisaries and Imperial Chinese eunuchs. This is purely coincidental and fleeting in the broad scheme of things.

Prescribing Western-style political institutions again might have its pitfalls. Public finance of parties does not necessarily weaken the influence of campaign donors even in the US where it is practiced. It might dampen but not eliminate it. And, at any rate, the need for donors features more at the national level. At the local level, political and economic dynasties are one and the same.

A majority of seats in Congress is dominated by dynasties including within the president’s Liberal Party (albeit by a smaller majority). Rather than decoupling the political from the economic classes or dismantling dynasties, shouldn’t we like Japan, Korea and Taiwan find a way to make this coupling work for our country by directing it to more productive ventures?

Yes, we can

The problem is not reform incapacity by our leaders. I would argue that under Mrs Aquino, the state exhibited a considerable degree of efficacy in achieving substantial economic reforms under difficult situations. From tax reform to foreign investments deregulation, flexible currency exchange to trade liberalization, wage decentralization to monetary independence, privatization to democratization, the list is quite impressive from a Western perspective.

The problem was that the agenda was perhaps too comprehensive instead of building one reform on the proven success of another. We shouldn’t blame Mrs Aquino for this. Her government was put in an institutional strait jacket by the IMF which today is imposing a heavy burden on some weak European countries. What EDSA-I demonstrated is that the country can achieve a consensus over a broad set of reforms and pursue it diligently.

The difficulty of governing in the shadow of one so revered as Mrs Aquino is much like the dilemma faced by the successor to Apple’s visionary CEO Steve Jobs. His mission now is not to “stuff up” the legacy. The overly cautious approach this breeds could prevent the sort of imaginative thinking that led to success in the first place.

East Asia didn’t buy into the comprehensive reform package that international donors, aid agencies and multilateral organizations were foisting on them. It opted to target areas that were more appropriate for its needs and developed its own recipe based on local ingredients. It caught up with Western living standards and then reformed some of its earlier idiosyncratic institutions which had by then become less useful.

Rather than applying the “second generation” reforms of the augmented Washington Consensus, following the “first generation” reforms tackled by Aquino I, the policymakers in advising Aquino II need to escape the poverty of ideas this represents. They should develop imaginative arrangements that will immediately unlock the productive capacity of our country. Only then can the son escape another sort of tyranny that seems to be afflicting us…the tyranny of low expectations.

Guanxi diagram courtesy of: China Australia consult

A full-blown economic storm

The perfect economic storm is now upon us.

As our political leaders as recently as this week continued to get caught up in the whirlwind of controversy surrounding the former president Gloria Arroyo, a storm of a different kind had been brewing on the horizon.

A few weeks ago, I had warned that the country was sailing right into this tempest almost unaware as its political class seemed more enamored by internal rather than international events. Finally, the stiff economic headwinds that I had been speaking of have finally turned into a fierce global contagion emanating from the US and Western Europe and spreading into Australasia.

The US is already half-way into a lost decade. Recent economic figures point to a prolonged slow recovery, and the likelihood of another recession now imminent. Western Europe is gripped with the bailout woes of the PIIGS economies with Italy now looking more likely to default. A bailout would require Germany and France, two of the largest economies, to undertake austerity measures of their own.

Even after Democrats and Republicans signed a deal to lift the debt ceiling, credit ratings agencies downgraded their outlook for the country as fixing their fiscal house in the long run seemed unlikely given the highly contentious nature of the package required for this almost ceremonial task. The tsunami has now hit Asian markets with East Asia and Australia taking a battering today.

China which has its own version of the sub-prime mortgage crisis developing with town and village councils saddled with loans resulting from its stimulus program could now find its growth slowing to below sustainable levels. And of course, the uprisings in MENA are continuing to raise the price of oil.

The Philippine government which was responsible for restraining growth in the fourth quarter of 2010 and the first quarter of 2011 with its self-imposed fiscal contraction will now wish that it had done more in those periods to foster growth to protect it from the global economic slowdown that now seems apparent.

What is at stake here are the remittances from overseas and the exports of goods (electronics, cars and machinery) and services (tourism and business processing) that have propped up our economy. With demand collapsing in the global economy, don’t expect these flows to materially rise in the coming years.

Secondly, the flow of investments or hot money would in a period of uncertainty normally seek safe havens. Unfortunately, the traditional safe haven of US treasury may no longer be as reliable as before. This could lead to significant depreciation of the greenback which will hit our competitiveness in global markets even more.

Thirdly, the PPPs which the government was hoping to augment its meager 2.5% of GDP spend on infrastructure (5% is the benchmark) could be threatened as investment funds now re-calibrate their tolerance for risk. The emerging market of Asia would be an alternative to the ailing Western economies, but that is no guarantee. With global demand easing, the need for foreign investments to expand production capacity diminishes.

Finally, what is to become of the government’s 7-8% growth target (minimum of 5%) on average for the next five years? It is more likely that global events will weigh down on the prospects for this. The government will have to work harder now to maintain fiscal and economic stability.